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Abstract
The challenges inherent in energy policy form an increasingly large proportion of the great issues of global
governance. These energy challenges reﬂect numerous transnational market or governance failures, and their solutions
are likely to require a number of global components that can support or constrain national energy policy. Governing
energy globally requires approaches that can simultaneously cope with three realities: the highly fragmented and
conﬂictual nature of the current inter-state system’s efforts to govern energy; the diversity of institutions and actors
relevant to energy; and the dominance of national processes of energy decision making that are not effectively
integrated into global institutions.
Policy Implications
• The lack of clarity on and priorities for the objectives of global energy governance impedes coordination and
communication.
• The energy landscape is littered with governors and institutions. But because they have emerged in a path-
dependent fashion, often in response to serial crisis, the result is an uncoordinated and inchoate landscape. There is
now a compelling need to harness this diversity productively.
• An emergent array of partnerships and networks are coming together, particularly with regard to clean energy
ﬁnance, which provide possible sources of governance innovation but also have the potential for low levels of
legitimacy and transparency.
• National decision making continues to drive energy policy, in ways that are poorly coordinated both internally and
with regard to global processes of governance. National energy policy processes need enormous improvement and
need to be consciously coordinated with global processes. The Asian giants will be crucial actors in this regard.
Why energy is a global governance challenge
Although energy-related policy issues frequently domi-
nate headlines, energy remains a surprising outlier in
global governance debates. In the vast literatures on the
shifting tides of globalization, the complexities of man-
aging an increasingly multipolar world with a pro-
nounced shift of power to Asia, and the rise of a
dizzying array of nonstate actors, energy policy issues at
best ﬁgure in occasional cameo appearances. We argue
that energy policy deserves a leading role.
The challenges inherent in energy policy form an
increasingly large proportion of the great issues of glo-
bal governance. These energy challenges have direct or
indirect global components that support or constrain
national policy options and private sector behaviors. We
frame the range of energy-related global governance
issues and brieﬂy assess the current conﬁguration of
global energy governors and institutions. We aim to con-
tribute to an emergent global conversation on how the
rapid changes in world order shape, and are shaped by,
energy-related developments. In this article, we use
public goods theory to help identify key energy-related
market and governance failures, highlight key obstacles
to coherent global energy governance and suggest
directions for a broader research agenda.
Framing global energy governance
Only in the past few years have international relations
and global governance scholars and policy analysts
begun to develop a signiﬁcant literature on broad frame-
works for understanding energy governance beyond the
national level (Cherp et al., 2011; Colgan, 2010; Florini,
2008; Florini and Sovacool, 2009, 2011; Goldthau and
Witte, 2009, 2010; Keohane and Victor, 2011; Lesage
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et al., 2010; Pascual and Elkind, 2010). Global energy
governance has been relatively unexplored in the litera-
ture, in part because it is hard to conceptualize as a
coherent ﬁeld. Historically, energy governance at both
national and global scales has been fragmented by
energy source – nuclear, oil and gas, coal, renewable
and so on. In addition, energy is closely intertwined with
the historical evolution of industrialization, and is a criti-
cal input to productive activity and social outcomes such
as health, education and habitats. Finally, the consump-
tion of energy comes with pervasive and persistent local
and global externalities, notably climate change. All
these aspects of energy use are studied, but it is daunt-
ing to consider the various interconnections within a sin-
gle rubric.
A few intrepid scholars have put forward interesting
conceptual frameworks that directly or indirectly are
applied to the energy arena. Cherp, Jewell and Goldthau
(2011), for example, make intriguing use of complexity
theory to explore global energy governance. Raustiala
and Victor (2004) suggest a ‘regime complex’ framework
for understanding issue areas characterized by multiple
overlapping regimes – an approach that may ﬁt well
with the variegated and fragmented nature of current
global energy governance. Goldthau and Witte (2009,
2010) have engaged in a deep exploration of market
mechanisms for oil and gas. The regime complex idea
has been applied to climate change by Keohane and
Victor (2011) and further extended by Abbot (2011).
Such theoretical framing is clearly crucial to research that
aims to focus on how energy should be governed at the
global level.
Our approach in this special issue and in this article
complements the early literature in at least three ways.
First, much of the literature cited above takes as its start-
ing point the existence of considerable challenges that
require global energy governance, but (with the partial
exception of Cherp, Jewell and Goldthau (2011) and
Florini and Sovacool, 2011) do not systematically identify
what the full range of objectives are, how these objec-
tives emerge or the level of legitimacy and support they
enjoy at the global level. The article begins with this
exercise which, we suggest, is a necessary ﬁrst step
to understanding the landscape of global energy
governance.
Second, based on our reading of the empirical land-
scape of energy, we go well beyond attention to the
international inter-state arena to include the role of non-
state actors in global energy governance, and to under-
stand decision making within national jurisdictions. Since
we do not have the luxury of starting with a blank slate,
an accurate mapping of the existing landscape is integral
to our understanding of global energy governance
challenges. Third, we complement the various efforts at
constructing theoretical frameworks with a focus on
policy-oriented frames and empirical questions of what
needs governing and who are the governors. In other
words, we aim to identify likely areas of market and gov-
ernance failures, and to investigate the range of relevant
actors. In the second part of the article, we map the
landscape of global energy governance, with the intent
of providing an empirically informed framework for
future research.
Objectives of global energy governance
Discussions on global energy governance are challenged
by a lack of systematic understanding on why gover-
nance at that level is needed and what its objectives
should be. Perhaps because so much of energy policy
has been shaped around barrels of oil and other private-
good energy sources, market solutions are often sug-
gested as ways of providing energy services (Goldthau
and Witte, 2010). But markets themselves require gover-
nance mechanisms that can enforce contracts, deﬁne
and enforce property rights, overcome excessive infor-
mation asymmetries or simple absence of information,
regulate natural monopolies and ensure fair competition
for resources. In the energy arena, these mechanisms are
often lacking, particularly at the cross-border level.
Moreover, numerous speciﬁc features of energy make
efﬁcient and effective energy markets particularly difﬁ-
cult to construct and maintain. Energy exhibits a host of
public goods problems, externalities, market failures,
coordination problems and competing interests that col-
lectively add up to an enormous governance challenge
(Florini and Sovacool, 2009), as will be explored through-
out this special issue. And overwhelmingly, these are
transnational or global, not purely national, in scope.
For Lesage, van de Graaf and Westphal (2010) the
emphasis is on how the contemporary context of multi-
polarity increases the challenges of coordination to
reduce conﬂict over energy and foster an energy transi-
tion. For many other writers, the challenge is dominated
by the global collective action problem of climate
change, a problem caused in large part by energy-
related emissions of greenhouse gasses. Cherp, Jewell
and Goldthau (2011) are the broadest in their framing,
examining energy security, energy access and climate
change as three distinct arenas within global energy
governance.
Drawing on a public goods framework allows us to
identify cross-border market and governance failures that
require governance intervention and to lay out the full
range of global energy governance objectives. Consis-
tent with our empirical approach, we identify these
objectives through close scrutiny of global political pro-
nouncements such as those emanating from G8 and G20
meetings, mandates and policy statements of interna-
tional institutions, and initiatives of nonstate actors and
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multistakeholder networks that have played an agenda-
setting role in energy governance. We group these
objectives under four headings, each of which is further
discussed below: energy supply security and geopolitics;
energy poverty; environmental externalities; and domes-
tic governance.
Energy supply security
Security of access to energy supply is a high priority for
all governments, one that they pursue through both
cooperative and competitive means. The centrality of oil
and natural gas to modern military operations and mod-
ern industry leads governments to interfere in open
market operations in the name of national security.
Nonetheless, reasonably efﬁcient global markets have
developed for various energy sources, and further devel-
opment of such markets could provide positive-sum
approaches to global energy governance. Yet what had
seemed to be a growing consensus on market-based
systems of energy security is now under threat. Many
governments, particularly in Asia, are increasingly pursu-
ing mercantilist approaches and territorial claims to
ensure energy supply security (Dubash, this issue; Kong,
this issue). In addition, oil price volatility renders markets
unstable. Because the nature of the oil industry (and
energy in general) requires very long-term planning and
investment, this is a particularly serious market failure.
Some of the global discourse about energy security is
quite broad. The G8 St Petersburg Statement on Global
Energy Security of 2006 conceived of energy security
as the challenge of ‘ensuring sufﬁcient, reliable and
environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices
reﬂecting market fundamentals’ (G8 Summit, 2006). That
declaration asserted that the ‘development of transpar-
ent, efﬁcient and competitive global energy markets’ is
the best way of achieving overall energy security (G8
Summit, 2006), a notion echoed by the wider G20 Sum-
mit statement at Pittsburgh in 2009 (G20 Summit, 2009).
This broadening is also echoed in the academic litera-
ture, which increasingly constructs energy security as
multifaceted, including concerns such as environment,
affordability and efﬁciency (Sovacool and Brown, 2010).
But overwhelmingly, the debate over energy security
remains a debate about access to oil (and increasingly
natural gas). Oil remains the single largest source of glo-
bal primary energy supply, accounting for roughly a
third, and drives the majority of transportation in
virtually all parts of the world. As oil rose in importance
starting in the mid-20th century, oil producers and con-
sumers organized separately and increasingly in reaction
to each other. The 1961 founding statute creating the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
explicitly states that the aim of coordinated action
among members was the interests of oil producers,
providing them a steady income and a fair return on
capital (OPEC, 2008; see also Goldthau and Witte, this
issue). The International Energy Agency (IEA), established
by the OECD as a club of oil consumers, had the explicit
aims of securing oil ‘on reasonable and equitable terms’
and creating a system to manage oil supply emergen-
cies. The instrument for achieving these goals was
sustaining ‘stable international trade in oil and …
promoting secure oil supplies on reasonable and equita-
ble terms’ (IEA, 2008; see also Florini, this issue).
Over time, this oppositional construction has softened,
and dialogue between consumers and producers has
been institutionalized in the form of the International
Energy Forum (IEF). Signiﬁcantly, in addition to creating
structures for dialogue, the IEF supports ongoing sharing
and collation of data in the form of the Joint Oil Data
Initiative. However, the improved dialogue has not yet
led to effective mechanisms that can reliably stabilize oil
prices, as became evident in the wild price swings of
2006–09.
Moreover, energy supply security is increasingly
reﬂected in regional agreements, notably in the ASEAN
Agreement on ASEAN Energy Cooperation (ASEAN, 1986)
and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT, 1994). Taken collec-
tively, these statements suggest considerable interna-
tional consensus on the importance of energy supply
security, and at least some investment in large-scale
coordination to enable countries to achieve energy
security, particularly through the smooth functioning of
energy markets.
But the geopolitics of energy security are not so easily
addressed. As readily available supplies fall short of rap-
idly increasing demand, we see growing competition for
energy resources, with energy at the heart of many of
the world’s most pressing geopolitical challenges. Proven
oil and gas reserves are heavily concentrated in a small
number of countries whose political stability is not
assured and where production is controlled by state-
owned ﬁrms whose ﬁdelity to market principles cannot
be assumed. Although ﬁgures on oil and gas reserves are
notoriously unreliable, the available data indicate that
well over half, and probably more in the order of 75 per
cent, of oil and gas reserves are held by these state-
owned ﬁrms (PetroStrategies Inc, 2010; US EIA, 2010).
The existing cooperative response by oil-consuming
countries, via the IEA’s coordination of national oil stock-
piles, does not include such enormous and rapidly grow-
ing sources of demand as India and China (Florini, this
issue). And the rising consumers have demonstrated a
lack of faith in international oil markets, with their much-
discussed efforts to develop overseas energy assets
(Dubash, this issue; Kong, this issue). The disputes in the
oil-rich South China Sea offer one clear indication of the
potential for conﬂict. Riven by conﬂicting territorial
claims involving China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Navroz K. Dubash and Ann Florini
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Indonesia and the Philippines, competition over the
South China Sea led to bloodshed between China and
Vietnam in 1974, and intense posturing between China
and the United States in 2010.
Energy poverty
Energy poverty is widespread and persistent. About 1.4
billion people lack access to electricity and 2.7 billion
use biomass for cooking (IEA, 2010), depriving them of
any opportunity to participate in energy-dependent
processes of economic modernization. Instead, these bil-
lions eke out a grueling existence, suffering the conse-
quences in health (indoor pollution from biomass
burning), opportunity costs (hours spent gathering
fuels, which cannot be spent more productively) and
environmental degradation (deforestation and soil
depletion). While energy poverty is largely a domestic
issue, its wide-scale global prevalence, the potential for
technological and institutional learning across borders
and its importance to the success of a broader anti-
poverty agenda make this an important issue for global
governance.
Although the eradication of poverty is a high-proﬁle
international cause, the poverty agenda is seldom
directly linked to energy. Yet, there is considerable evi-
dence that access to energy and the quantum of its use
is closely correlated with both economic growth
(Feinstein, 2002) and advances in human development
(Martinez and Ebenhack, 1997).
To the degree that international pronouncements on
development and poverty do mention energy, they tend
to fall into three broad categories: big picture calls link-
ing energy and development; more explicit, if back door,
linkages between energy and poverty in the context of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and a few
direct efforts to address energy poverty.
First, on occasion global political declarations from the
G8 and G20 allude to the role of energy in alleviating
poverty. But these passing mentions stand in contrast to
the explicit focus and attention given to concerns such
as energy security at St Petersburg in 2006, and climate
change at Gleneagles in 2005. When energy poverty is
mentioned, it tends to be couched within larger objec-
tives. Thus, the St Petersburg Declaration links energy to
‘quality of life and opportunities’, the Pittsburgh G20
Declaration links access to energy with ‘sustainable
growth’ and the Gleneagles Declaration calls for increas-
ing access to modern energy services as part of a larger
package aimed at addressing climate change and achiev-
ing sustainable development.
Second, energy has a complex relationship to UN-led
initiatives on global poverty and sustainable develop-
ment. This complexity is, arguably, due to an unresolved
question at the root of sustainable development – are
increasing growth and consumption really compatible
with environmental sustainability? (Lele, 1991) This ques-
tion has the potential to pit energy haves against have
nots; the latter fear that environmental concerns will
perpetuate their low energy consumption levels. By one
interpretation, the lack of an MDG on energy is an arti-
fact of these tensions (Hodas, 2010). These environment
versus development tensions are also apparent in the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which pointedly notes that, climate change concerns
notwithstanding, developing countries in particular will
need to increase their energy consumption in order to
achieve ‘sustainable social and economic development’
(UNFCCC, 1992).
Given the absence of an MDG on energy, energy for
development and poverty alleviation has been worked
on to the international agenda in less direct ways. For
example, UN-Energy, the coordinating mechanism for
energy across the UN, devoted its ﬁrst report to energy
poverty in ‘recognition of the centrality of providing
energy services in the pursuit of the MDGs’ (UN-Energy,
2005, p. 1). Despite the lack of explicit attention to
energy in Agenda 21, the Commission on Sustainable
Development charged with its implementation has
focused on energy for its ninth, 14th and 15th meetings
(Hodas, 2010). However, as the CSD-15 chairperson’s
report notes, considerable divisions remained around
energy and climate change (CSD, 2007).
Third, multilateral donor agencies such as the World
Bank have placed some emphasis on energy access for
the poor, but this is often subordinate to a larger objec-
tive of neoliberal reform. For example, the World Bank’s
inﬂuential energy strategy of 1993 which guided its
work for nearly a decade focused on structural reform,
increasing private sector participation, improved regula-
tion and promotion of commercial practices (World
Bank, 1993). Such reforms, which do not speciﬁcally
incentivize service to the poor, have not necessarily
reduced energy poverty. By the late 1990s, the World
Bank’s attention had shifted to developing an energy
and environment strategy, although many of the earlier
objectives around sector reform found a place in this
strategy under a new guise (World Bank, 2000). The only
explicit mention of energy poverty as one of four objec-
tives comes in an ‘informal’ 2001 strategy to supple-
ment the environment strategy (Feinstein, 2002).1 More
recently, the World Bank is considering a new strategy
that is organized directly around two pillars: improving
access and reliability of energy supply; and facilitating a
transition to clean energy (Nakhooda, this issue; World
Bank, 2009). This twin objective reﬂects, perhaps, a
growing clarity that both these aims have to be pursued
simultaneously, even if tensions over whether the two
are in conﬂict or not have as yet been incompletely
addressed.
Mapping Global Energy Governance
9
Global Policy (2011) 2:SI ª 2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Environmental sustainability
The rise of environmental sustainability as an important
objective of global energy governance is arguably the
single most dramatic shift in the global energy land-
scape over the last two decades. This attention has been
propelled by the threat of global climate change but
also includes concerns of local pollutants, the environ-
mental costs of mining, and other, non-energy-related
environmental concerns.
The sustainability thread runs from the 1972 Stock-
holm Conference on the environment, through the 1988
Brundtland Report which provided a single (if not partic-
ularly satisfying) deﬁnition of sustainable development,
to the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio, which sought to opera-
tionalize the concept. While Stockholm set the stage for
recognition of environmental challenges, Rio focused
attention on the global character of these problems.2 As
discussed above, while the Rio Declaration and Agenda
21 did not have explicit sections on energy, the linkages
to energy through protection of the atmosphere, agricul-
ture and other sectoral concerns are clear.3 The most
consequential outcome of Rio from an energy perspec-
tive, however, is undoubtedly the UNFCCC and its subse-
quent process. Given that energy accounts for some
two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions, climate policy
necessarily carries potentially signiﬁcant consequences
for the future of energy globally.
Moving beyond global declarations and conventions,
notable among efforts to internalize the environmental
sustainability objective is the World Bank’s articulation of
an environment strategy for energy in its 2000 Fuel for
Thought document. This document broke new ground
for an institution that hitherto had focused on ﬁnancing
and promoting new sources of energy supply by
acknowledging and seeking to internalize the existence
of environmental trade-offs (see Nakhooda, this issue).
Although the extent of changes in lending practices and
even in the underlying approach are debated (Mainhardt-
Gibbs, 2009), the objectives are clearly reoriented to
favor environmental outcomes.
More recently, and as the climate change negotia-
tions have become increasingly bogged down, energy-
related environmental concerns have increasingly found
their way into high-level political statements. The G8
Gleneagles Communiqué of 2005 squarely sought to
reinvigorate global action on climate change. The Pitts-
burgh G20 summit in 2009 focused on promoting
energy efﬁciency in particular by phasing out subsidies
for fossil fuel, in part because they impeded a transi-
tion to clean energy sources, a concern echoed by the
Leaders Declaration from the Asia Paciﬁc Economic
Cooperation (APEC). Perhaps even more instructive, it is
rare to see a global political declaration, whether of
the G8 ⁄20 or the Major Economies Forum, that fails to
make an explicit reference to the need for attention to
the global environment in general and climate change
in particular.
And climate is increasingly seen as more than an
environmental externality. Its sweeping implications
make it a question of national and international security.
The UN General Assembly in a 2009 resolution expressed
its deep concern ‘that the adverse impacts of climate
change, including sea-level rise, could have possible
security implications’, and asked for a report from the
Secretary General (United Nations, 2009). A number of
retired senior American generals and admirals released a
report in 2007 expressing deep concerns over the poten-
tial for climate change to serve as a threat multiplier and
thus directly endanger national security (CNAC, 2007). By
2010, climate change had become an explicit item in the
US National Security Strategy, which noted that ‘The
change wrought by a warming planet will lead to new
conﬂicts over refugees and resources; new suffering from
drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and
the degradation of land across the globe’ (White House,
2010).
Domestic good governance and corruption
Energy has been susceptible to a high degree of corrup-
tion and rent seeking because of the ease of bypassing
normal channels of accountability, the concentration of
fossil fuel deposits in countries that have not yet devel-
oped effective domestic institutions, and the tendency
to deliver energy services through highly centralized
large infrastructure projects. Consequently, energy-
related concerns have been critical to pushing domestic
good governance concerns up the global governance
agenda. The landmark Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery con-
vention of 1997, which was the ﬁrst instance of an anti-
corruption instrument on the ‘supply side’ of a bribery
transaction, is a notable example of this emergent atten-
tion (OECD, 2010). Others include the UN Convention
against Corruption of 2003 and Principle 10 of the UN
Global Compact which enjoins business against corrup-
tion (United Nations, 2003, 2004).
It is important to recognize the importance of energy
to global ﬁnancial ﬂows. In the mid-1990s, for example,
oil and gas and power sector investments together
accounted for about 40 per cent of export credit agency
ﬁnancing, which is the main mechanism through which
governments support overseas investment and trade by
their companies (Maurer and Bhandari, 2000). In many
cases these transactions involve dealing with govern-
ments that have direct ownership over energy resources,
leaving enormous scope for rent seeking (Clifford, 2006;
Global Witness, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Kolas
and Tonnesson, 2006).
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Growing attention to energy and domestic governance
owes a great deal to the activities of civil society groups
that have played an important role in bringing instances
of corruption to light, and institutionalizing mechanisms
such as disclosure-based regulatory tools (Florini and
Saleem, this issue). Although this new impulse is yet to
command the sort of global consensus at the multilat-
eral level that marks many of the other objectives dis-
cussed here, it is included as an important new and
growing area of concern for global energy governance.
Toward a framework for global energy
governance
To understand global energy governance requires blur-
ring several boundaries – between different fuel sources
and markets, between state and nonstate actors and
between global and national scales. We now turn to a
more detailed exploration of all three, as crucial compo-
nents of a conceptual framework.
Understanding fragmented global energy governance:
the trade-offs and the actors
Global energy governance is a challenge in part because,
as the discussion above suggests, the objectives around
which governance is organized are themselves frag-
mented, inconsistent and unprioritized. To the degree
that states and other actors have established rules and
organizations to try to deal with the four sets of mar-
ket ⁄governance failures, it has generally been as a result
of a particular crisis (as in the case of oil in the 1970s),
or as a sideline of efforts to achieve other objectives
(such as the energy poverty role of the multilateral
development banks as a component of their larger
development mission). Each issue has moved up the pol-
icy agenda of late for a host of idiosyncratic reasons. As
they do so, the tensions among them, and the lack of
capacity to resolve those tensions, are becoming more
and more apparent.
Thus, concern about energy supply security grew out
of the oil crises of the 1970s, and has since been redis-
covered in many other guises, most recently in reaction
to growing demand from Asia. Energy as an issue of
environmental sustainability came of age in the late
1980s and 1990s with the spread of the modern environ-
mental movement and acquired momentum with grow-
ing concern over global climate change. Domestic
governance concerns around corruption were layered on
in the late 1990s in reaction to high-proﬁle cases of
energy infrastructure corruption. Although poverty allevi-
ation concerns have been with us as a global issue since
at least Robert McNamara’s tenure at the World Bank in
the 1970s, the concept of energy poverty as a speciﬁc
focus has emerged much more recently.
Trade-offs across energy objectives complicate gover-
nance. Energy supply security may be inconsistent with
environmental sustainability in the short to medium
term, particularly in the context of dependence on coal
as a primary source of energy. Similarly, with looming
pressures to limit greenhouse gas emissions, the trade-
off between development objectives and environmental
sustainability has taken the form of a deadlock over
‘burden sharing’ at the climate negotiations (Dubash and
Rajamani, 2010). Energy supply security can also run
counter to concerns of domestic governance, as access
to or transport of mineral fuels such as oil and gas are
increasingly stymied by domestic governance concerns,
often brought to the public eye by transnational advo-
cacy networks (Global Witness, 2011). Similarly, domestic
governance concerns threaten security of supply in the
absence of credible institutional arrangements to man-
age corruption and other such concerns.
These trade-offs are not immutable. They are a func-
tion of the current dysfunctional system: high demand
for fossil fuels; the failure to internalize full costs; weak
institutional underpinnings for markets in those com-
modities; and weak governance capacity to manage
markets and provide public goods. In other words, the
trade-offs between environmental sustainability and
energy supply security and development are binding
under current technological conditions, but may not be
so in a low-cost clean energy future.
There are two ways past fragmented and inconsistent
governance objectives: ameliorate the trade-offs through,
for example, rapid technological or institutional change;
or do a better job of prioritizing among the objectives.
Both require more effective global collective action than
exists at present. The climate negotiations could drive a
technology agenda, but so far have arguably exacer-
bated regulatory uncertainty rather than incentivizing
investment in clean energy. Indeed, balanced between
historically large emitters led by the US and a resurgent
bloc of newly industrializing countries led by China, cli-
mate politics are particularly prey to the challenges of
governance in a multipolar world.
The existing transnational framework of principles,
rules, norms and processes governing energy – the insti-
tutions (as opposed to organizations) of global energy
governance – are currently far too incomplete and dis-
connected to address any of the market ⁄governance
failures adequately, much less to address the trade-offs
among them. The institutions cluster around particular
fuel sources (such as oil or nuclear power), each requir-
ing different technical expertise, language and under-
standings based on the professionalization of the
different energy spheres, making communication across
them difﬁcult even if it were desired. This has led some
analysts to explore the idea that energy is characterized
not by a single regime in the formal sense of a coherent
Mapping Global Energy Governance
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framework of principles, rules, norms and decision-
making processes (Krasner, 1983), but instead by invok-
ing polycentric and overlapping arenas (Cherp, Jewell
and Goldthau (2011)). Even within these subareas,
however, with the possible exception of nuclear energy,
sector-speciﬁc institutional frameworks lack the compre-
hensive scope, cogency and robustness that characterize
an international regime.
At present, the governors – the concrete organizations
and entities that play some role in global energy gover-
nance – consist of a relative handful of organizations,
limited in scope and capacity. They have arisen in idio-
syncratic fashion, in response to speciﬁc problems or cri-
ses, starting with those in the oil sector. The oil sector is
rife with collective action problems around adequate
availability, price stability and incentives for long-term
investment. OPEC, an association of petroleum producers
that came to fame in the 1970s for its role in sparking
dramatic increases in oil prices, represents the oil inter-
ests of only some of the world’s major oil suppliers
(Witte and Goldthau, this issue). OPEC coexists with the
IEA, which was set up initially as a club of consumer
countries to address vulnerability to excessive oil depen-
dence during the 1970s oil crises. Although it has since
broadened its agenda, the IEA remains a relatively tiny
organization with fewer than 250 staff at its Paris head-
quarters and a state membership limited to OECD mem-
bers (Florini, this issue).
The past two decades have seen some efforts to
strengthen the organizational infrastructure of global
energy governance. The International Energy Forum,
which began as a series of biennial meetings of energy
ministers to bridge producer and consumer nations,
including those that are not members of OPEC or the
IEA, was institutionalized with the creation of a secretar-
iat that began work in Riyadh in December 2003 (IEF,
2010). UN-Energy was established in the aftermath of
the 2002 World Conference on Sustainable Development
in Johannesburg as an attempt to bring together the
assortment of UN bodies that play some role in energy,
although it lacks substantial resources (UN-Energy, 2010).
With greater attention to renewable energy sources has
come the 2009 creation of the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA), a new intergovernmental organi-
zation outside the UN system, headquartered in Abu
Dhabi with a technical offshoot based in Bonn (IRENA,
2010; see also Florini, this issue).
Other intergovernmental organizations whose man-
dates extend beyond energy can nonetheless be consid-
ered important global energy governors. The World Bank
and other multilateral development banks serve both as
key funding channels and as sources of ideas and norms
about what constitutes good energy policy at the
national level (Nakhooda, this issue). As more major oil
exporters move to join and as the potential for
climate-related trade barriers looms larger, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) is being pulled into dealing
with a broad range of global energy governance con-
cerns.
But clearly, none of these existing organizations can
lay claim to a central coordinating role in global energy
governance; nor are effective processes in place to coor-
dinate action among them all. Summit processes such as
the G8 and now the G20 are often looked to as a way of
coordinating action among leading states, and the G8
has frequently, though not always effectively, made com-
mitments related to energy and climate. One of the
G20’s early steps has been a broad agreement to reduce
energy subsidies (Van de Graaf and Westphal, this issue).
But by no means could it be said that either the G8 or
the G20 has yet shown the interest or ability to grapple
with the full range of global energy governance collec-
tive action needs and address the trade-offs among
them.
Global governance beyond the intergovernmental
As most global governance scholars have come to agree,
looking at intergovernmental processes is only part of
the story of governance in any arena. As Avant,
Finnemore and Sell put it recently,
The global policy arena is ﬁlled with a wide
variety of actors – international organizations,
corporations, professional associations, advocacy
groups, and the like – seeking to ‘govern’ activ-
ity in issue areas they care about. These actors
are not merely occupying global structures.
They are active agents who want new structures
and rules (or different rules) to solve problems,
change outcomes, and transform international
life. Governors are thus engaged in processes
that are both quintessentially political and
dynamic, even transformational (Avant et al.,
2010, p. 1).
Energy is no different. Beyond the formal intergovern-
mental organizations and summit processes outlined
above lies a complex array of national actors, nongov-
ernmental actors and hybrid entities that all play roles in
global energy governance. This complex institutional
diversity offers great potential for dynamic change – or
for institutional competition, or for overall incoherence.
As Newell (this issue) sketches out, transnational
energy ﬁnance has a particularly complex landscape that
strongly shapes how energy sources are developed and
energy services are ultimately provided. He points to
three categories – public governance of public ﬁnance;
public governance of private ﬁnance; and private gover-
nance of private ﬁnance – each of which includes
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multiple and overlapping actors and authorities. As
Wright (this issue) and Nakhooda (this issue) show, in
addition to national governments regulating investment
through national law and policy (Hamilton, 2009), private
ﬁnance is also regulated globally, if indirectly, by the rule
structures of national export credit agencies, which are
in turn coordinated through the OECD Arrangement,
and by the private sector arms of multilateral banks. In
addition, more subtle forms of governing include the
role of networks such as one coordinated by the UN
Environment Programme, regional mechanisms such as
the Asia Paciﬁc Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate, and multistakeholder partnerships such as the
Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership, all
of which play a handmaiden role in mobilizing ﬁnance
for energy (Florini and Sovacool, 2009, 2011; Newell, this
issue).
The enormous gaps in global energy governance,
particularly the absence of transnational regulation in
regard to climate change and oil ⁄gas markets, and the
poor quality of energy governance at the domestic level
have attracted efforts to develop innovative responses.
Many of these come in the form of information disclo-
sure programs, usually voluntary, that aim to make mar-
kets function more efﬁciently, induce private actors
(particularly corporations) to internalize externalities even
in the absence of enforceable regulations and ⁄or
improve democratic processes (Florini and Saleem, this
issue). Such initiatives as the Carbon Disclosure Project,
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the
Energy Governance Initiative all aim to change behavior
by inducing actors to reveal information in various
forms.
It is not clear how the various pieces of this dizzying
array of initiatives, actors and processes do or can ﬁt
together. At every stage of collective action – agenda
setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring,
enforcement – multiple authorities are putting forward
demands. There is likely to be institutional competition
across the various actors and approaches. For example,
it will be interesting to see how hybrid actors such as
REN21 and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency
Partnership (REEEP), with their limited staffs and budgets,
interact with a major new intergovernmental organiza-
tion like IRENA. There may be ﬁrst-mover advantages in
a world in which states no longer enjoy automatic pri-
macy, or we may ﬁnd that the existence of an intergov-
ernmental organization with broad membership alters
the space available to other actors.
With so many relatively new and untested governance
approaches under way, it is not clear which of the com-
peting claims for legitimacy and authority will stand the
test of time. Experimental regulatory processes (‘self-
regulation’, codes of conduct, guidelines, etc.) raise
questions about both efﬁcacy and legitimacy. Hybrid
authorities bring together public and private actors
which interact to shape untested forms of governance
with uncertain accountability mechanisms. Those hybrids
include a strikingly wide range of combinations of actors.
The Berne Union, for example, acts as a nonproﬁt ‘trade
association’ of export credit agencies, of which some are
involved in an enormous share of all energy project
ﬁnance (Wright, this issue). Mapping and harnessing this
diversity of governors may be critical to future solutions
to fragmented and ineffective global energy governance.
The nation state in global energy governance
Understanding global energy governance requires treat-
ing the boundary between domestic and international
politics as porous. What happens in global organizations
reﬂects the decisions and priorities of their constituent
parts, which in intergovernmental organizations are the
member states. Despite the growing signiﬁcance of non-
state actors, the most important drivers of policy at all
levels continue to be territorially based states. Thus, it is
crucial to pay close attention to the particularities of
national politics around energy on their own terms, in
order to understand how they are shaped by and shape
global politics of energy. Indeed, close attention to the
interaction between global and national energy gover-
nance is a distinctive aspect of the framework outlined
in this special issue.
The country case studies in this special issue, on
China, India and the Philippines, point to an interesting
contradiction. Each country has particularistic politics
around energy, shaped by natural resource endowments
and local institutional histories consistent with broader
national patterns. Yet all three countries exhibit a
remarkable consistency in the broader patterns of gover-
nance over time. For example, all three sought to open
their energy sectors to competition and private involve-
ment in the 1980s and 1990s, although this tendency
was less pronounced in China. Thus, new laws were
passed dissolving state monopolies and independent
regulators were created, albeit with only moderate
amounts of success. By the turn of the century, however,
energy security had replaced the market as the domi-
nant narrative. For example, the Philippines has explicitly
sought to redeﬁne its energy governance around the
objective of energy security. India has embedded its
other energy concerns, including issues of global climate
change, within a larger energy security narrative. China
has launched a systematic effort at acquiring overseas
energy assets. These consistent cross-country patterns
suggest structures of energy governance that are shaped
globally but mediated by nationally speciﬁc factors.
The empirical evidence also speaks to how global
forces work to inﬂuence national decisions. There is little
evidence that global trends such as deepening of
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markets or attention to energy security operate through
explicit efforts at coordinated action through global
organizations. National energy policy makers seldom
refer to international standards, as occurs in the trade or
the telecoms sector, for example. Instead, the micro-
politics of national energy decision making depends on
balancing competing domestic concerns, in a manner
largely devoid of reference to international organizations.
Instead, global inﬂuences operate through larger ideo-
logical and normative shifts, of which the attention to
markets is the paradigmatic example. Normative shifts
also occur through subtle mechanisms such as policy
transplant and institutional isomorphism, such as the
spread of independent energy regulators across many
countries within a short period (Levi-Faur et al., 2009).
Multilateral development banks, such as the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have proven to
be particularly important vectors for transmission of new
ideas and norms (Nakhooda, this issue). As such, they
are the partial exceptions to the ﬁnding that interna-
tional energy organizations are largely invisible to
domestic policy makers. Most signiﬁcant, they have been
important agents of translating broader ideological shifts
into sector-speciﬁc recommendations. For example,
developing and popularizing the idea of unbundled and
privatized electricity markets can substantially be attrib-
uted to the development banks. In addition, in cases
such as India and the Philippines, they have actively pro-
moted adoption of these prescriptions, often supported
by local champions of the same ideas, through lending
policies. The development banks emerge as the most
signiﬁcant single set of international actors shaping
national energy governance.
But global patterns introduced in this fashion have
proven to have limited staying power. The transition to
market-oriented national energy sectors, in particular,
has been halting and incomplete in the face of the
fraught domestic politics of redistribution associated
with energy price reform. Instead of diffusing control
and expanding competition in energy, Asian economies
have witnessed the consolidation of state-led national
champions, which have now begun to turn their gaze
overseas (Dubash, this issue; Kong, this issue). The emer-
gent narrative of energy supply security as the dominant
objective of national policy, which has arisen due to
simultaneously expanding global demand and fears
of fossil fuel supply constraint, has reinforced the
continuation of a substantial state role in national
energy sectors.
Notably, this new narrative is substantially unmediated
by global organizations. Indeed, with a shift in attention
toward energy supply security, there is evidence of a
growing disjuncture between the operating assumptions
of international energy organizations and national gov-
ernments, at least in rapidly growing Asian economies.
The dominant narrative of the IEA, for example, backed
by political declarations by the G8 and G20, is of a lib-
eral market order to govern energy. However, in China,
India and the Philippines, policy makers appear to be
hedging their bets by also placing considerable empha-
sis on sovereign control over energy resources. In China
and, to some extent, in India this takes the form of mer-
cantile strategies. Both countries are also emphasizing
development of new technologies such as solar power
which do not depend on international energy trade.
Continued mixed sentiments over the wisdom and viabil-
ity of mercantile versus market strategies are likely to
heighten the challenges of future global governance of
energy.
Will the rise of global environmental issues up the glo-
bal political agenda, and concerns over climate change
in particular, be a potential game changer? Given the
enormous relevance of energy to the climate system, a
comprehensive global climate agreement organized
around explicit national carbon caps would be transfor-
mative and become a de facto global energy gover-
nance regime. However, with growing political deadlock
in climate negotiations, this outcome appears increas-
ingly unlikely. Another possibility is a ‘bottom-up’ cli-
mate regime organized around national actions, which
will then be subject to some form of coordinated global
scrutiny, much as was articulated in the controversial
‘Copenhagen Accord’ (Bodansky, 2010). Yet another
might be a hybrid version of the two that links bottom-
up actions with top-down benchmarks against which
national actions are measured (Dubash and Rajamani,
2010). Which of these approaches results from the nego-
tiation process depends largely on how the entrenched
politics of climate change are worked out.
One of the most signiﬁcant developments in global
governance generally – the emergence of a more multi-
polar system that particularly reﬂects the rapid growth
of China and India – is reﬂected in the degree to which
these countries are actively shaping global climate poli-
tics. As the country case studies in this special issue
show, any climate-related national actions in rapidly
emerging Asia, at least, are likely to be couched within
the frame of ‘co-beneﬁts’ – development actions that
bring simultaneous climate beneﬁts. China’s and India’s
energy efﬁciency and renewable energy efforts, under-
taken primarily for energy security reasons, are good
illustrations of this approach. If a regime based on such
national actions emerges, it will be an interesting
example of global coordination through disclosure and
scrutiny rather than explicit regulation.4 And it will
reinforce the importance of understanding national
politics of energy as an essential component of global
energy governance.
While the climate arena shows the growing conﬁdence
of the Asian giants as potential rule makers, there is little
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evidence that they are creatively articulating similarly
cogent ideas for energy governance writ large. And
there is scant evidence of collective engagement with
the many rule takers – such as the Philippines – to craft
a large Asian voice in global energy governance. Instead,
as major new consumers of energy, there is a collective
wariness of global forces that may conspire to stiﬂe
access to energy for Asia’s rapidly growing new powers.
Diplomatic and political attention is focused on staving
off this challenge, rather than on crafting a governance
structure that provides coordinated institutional
responses to contemporary energy challenges.
Conclusions: new directions for global energy
governance
The existing energy-related global governance mecha-
nisms consist of overlapping and partial institutional
frameworks based primarily around fuel sectors. To the
extent that there are mechanisms with broad reach (such
as the G-summit processes and the UNFCCC), they are
not hierarchical and currently offer very weak mecha-
nisms for resolving trade-offs. National energy policy
making – still the most important level of decision
making – is poorly integrated with transnational pro-
cesses. Other governors, including private transnational
networks, rely on multiple and not well-tested sources of
authority.
In short, the achievements of global energy gover-
nance fall far short of any reasonable assessment of a
good outcome. Global energy governance consists of
inadequate and uncoordinated mechanisms attempting
to achieve fragmented and unprioritized objectives
which pose as yet unresolved structural trade-offs. We
do not currently have the institutional infrastructure
needed to address the signiﬁcant and urgent challenges
we face.
Fortunately, none of the existing shortcomings of
global energy governance are written in stone. The
structures that impose those trade-offs are institutional,
and thus subject to human agency. Thus, the key policy
research question is how the existing institutional
constraints can be altered.
An obvious starting point is to focus on ways to
leverage more productively the existing formal intergov-
ernmental actors. These include not only the energy-
focused IGOs such as the IEA, IEF and IRENA, but also
the key de facto intergovernmental governors, notably
the multilateral development banks. Although relevant
studies of some individual organizations have appeared
in the last few years (particularly the IEA and the World
Bank), others, such as the IEF and IRENA, have largely
escaped scholarly scrutiny (in some cases because the
organizations are only beginning to ﬁgure as signiﬁcant
actors). The articles in this special issue are meant to
provide a starting point for what should become a more
fully developed literature.
A key research need that emerges from this collec-
tion’s emphasis on speciﬁc actors is to deepen attention
to national energy governance in key countries and draw
out the implications for global governance. In particular,
there is a need to expand beyond the Asian giants to
consider more broadly the impact of the diffusion of
state power to a larger number of emerging countries,
notably Mexico, Brazil and South Africa. What does such
widening multipolarity imply for governance of and by
energy-related intergovernmental organizations? What
views will these emerging actors hold toward the
acceptability of reliance on energy markets whose
smooth operation requires successful global cooperation,
versus the notion that energy security demands active
state intervention and a degree of sovereign self-
reliance?
Widening multipolarity is also testing international
agreement on challenging new issues such as climate
change, as new powers bring different interests and
understandings to the table. On climate change, a major
divide has emerged between established industrial
powers and fast-growing newly industrializing countries.
As a result of very different interests – existing industrial
powers wish to structure a regime with equivalent
actions for all, while emerging powers argue that past
emissions should be accounted for – each side seeks to
frame the debate in different ways. Climate negotiations
have foundered in part because there is no global mech-
anism to forge a shared understanding on how a climate
regime should operate, before getting down to the
nitty-gritty of negotiations. The G20 is currently the most
plausible forum where broad directions for global energy
governance could be decided, making it an important
arena to watch for the future.
A great deal of governance is happening at levels sep-
arate from national governments and formal intergov-
ernmental processes. As this special issue’s articles make
clear, there is an extraordinary diversity of actors and
institutions that matter in determining energy policy.
However, it is not clear how to assess the scale and sig-
niﬁcance of those global governance approaches that go
beyond formal architecture and structures. The articles
make signiﬁcant progress in mapping many of those
approaches and evaluating individual cases, but much
more research is needed to understand how they inter-
act. Multistakeholder networks and disclosure-based
quasi-regulatory systems are springing up everywhere –
but to what effect? Is the net result of this plethora of
actors and approaches a complex adaptive system with
emergent properties that are distinct from the character-
istics of the component parts? Or is the outcome primar-
ily one of institutional competition and incoherence?
How can we evaluate the legitimacy and accountability
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questions of nonstate and hybrid governors? To what
extent does their writ run in thinly democratic systems?
These questions may well be especially important for
the development of new energy technologies, an arena
that is particularly dense with networks, partnerships
and other forms of nontraditional governors. And much
rests on the success of technology development to
avoid future conﬂict. For example, while fossil fuels are
the cheapest way to alleviate energy poverty, they
exacerbate climate change and portend geopolitical
conﬂicts. While new green energy technology is a private
good, there is also a strong case for global coordination
to ensure rapid dissemination and adoption. How is this
to be achieved in an institutional environment dense
with multivalent actors?
But perhaps the most important and difﬁcult chal-
lenge is to overcome the extreme disconnect between
national energy policy making and the transnational
governors and mechanisms. Very few countries have
coherent structures in place at the national level to
enable any kind of coherent interaction with global
energy institutions. Only in December 2010 did the Uni-
ted States announce the creation of a Bureau of Energy
Resources to be part of the Department of State, ‘to
unite [its] diplomatic and programmatic efforts on oil,
natural gas, coal, electricity, renewable energy, energy
governance, strategic resources, and energy poverty’,
and virtually no others have anything similar (QDDR,
2010).
The interface between the national and global levels
requires attention to two questions: how are global
inﬂuences shaping national policy choices, and how are
global norms emerging out of national contexts? These
questions are of particular importance with regard to the
emerging nations of Asia, where mushrooming energy
demand is coinciding with rapidly increasing global inﬂu-
ence. The articles in this special issue include analysis of
whether India and China are emerging as rule makers
and ⁄or norm setters, questions that will merit sustained
attention in coming decades. But such questions deserve
attention with regard to a much larger swath of existing
and emerging major energy suppliers and consumers.
Finally, as the climate change regime emerges, it is
worth paying attention to the possibility that global gov-
ernance around energy will take the form of common
procedures for reporting and dialogue around national
policy actions, rather than around globally agreed sub-
stantive commitments.
This article has sought to provide a framework that
allows us to understand the variegated symptoms pro-
duced by a dysfunctional global energy governance sys-
tem. Because energy institutions have been formulated
with regard to speciﬁc energy sources, those institutions
are not able to address the intertwined market and gov-
ernance failures that impede transition to a more sus-
tainable system. But with this framework in mind, it is
possible to consider the objectives toward which efforts
at improving energy governance should be directed, and
to identify the governors and relationships that need to
be better understood.
Notes
The authors wish to thank Karthik Nachiappan and Saleena Saleem
for excellent research assistance on this article.
1. A 2009 approach paper towards a new World Bank strategy
identiﬁes the 2001 document as an ‘informal strategy’.
2. UN General Assembly Resolution 44 ⁄ 228 setting in place a nego-
tiation process for a framework convention on climate change
explicitly recognizes the ‘global character’ of many environmen-
tal problems.
3. See, for example, the Agenda 21 chapter on ‘Sustainable Agricul-
ture and Rural Development’ which calls for a mix of ‘cost effective
fossil and renewable energy sources that is itself sustainable’.
4. This approach underpinned the subsequent Cancun Agreements
of 2010 (see Cancun Agreements, 2010), but the target-setting
approach of the Kyoto Protocol also received a partial reprieve,
leaving the ﬁnal architecture of the climate regime somewhat
unclear.
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